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FEDERAL ESTATE TAX-VALUATION OF A DECEASED
SPOUSE'S INTEREST IN COMMUNITY OWNED
STOcK-Estate of Lee v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 860 (1978).
In Estate of Lee v. Commissioner,' the United States Tax Court held
that a deceased spouse's one-half interest in a community owned block of
shares should be valued after the block is divided in half for inclusion in
the gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. The court concluded that
the shares being valued constituted a minority interest subject to dis-
count. 2 Because the Lee valuation approach offers obvious advantages to
residents of community property states, it will undoubtedly be adopted by
other courts in community property states. 3
Elizabeth and Rhoady Lee, Washington residents, transferred substan-
tial property to their controlled corporation, F. W. Palin Trucking, Inc.,
intending to use the reorganized company as an estate planning vehicle. 4
In the process of reorganization, shares representing one-third of the Palin
stock were purchased from a nonfamily holder. Recapitalization created
two classes of stock, common and preferred. The Lees owned 80% of the
common stock and 100% of the preferred as community property. 5 Their
son held the remaining 20% of the common shares. The resulting closely
held corporation was a holding company which engaged in minimal busi-
1. Estate of Lee v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 860 (1978), appeal dismissed per stipulation, No.
79-7223 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 1979).
2. The court never mentioned minority discounts in its opinion, but recognized that the method it
adopted would result in lower value. Id. at 873 n.6.
3. See Greene, Valuation Inclusion of Community Property in the Gross Estate: A New Ap-
proach, 15 Hous. L. Rev. 93 (1977) for a general discussion of the possible advantages of this valua-
tion method. Greene notes that the method gives residents of community property states a signifi-
cantly lower valuation than residents of common law states. A federal district court in Texas recently
decided a case very similar to Lee. That court ruled before trial without explanation that as a matter of
law no element of control could be attributed to the deceased spouse in determining the value of her
interest in the corporation. Estate of Bright v. United States, No. CA-3-76-1264-F (N.D. Tex.,
filed Apr. 13, 1978) appeal docketed, No. 78-2221 (5th Cir., June 7, 1978).
4. Mrs. Lee's codicil to her first will expressed the Lees' intent in recapitalizing the corporation:
My husband and I and our children are financially interested in substantial and diverse
businesses and properties and have been working toward a reorganization of our business inter-
ests to the end of having a centralized management, coordination and control of said businesses;
and as a part of the comprehensive plan of reorganization, it is the intent and purpose of my
husband to transfer the majority of our property to one business entity; namely, F. W. Palin
Trucking Company.
Estate of Lee v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 860, 864 (1978).
5. Each share of common stock was entitled to one vote in the management of the corporation.
The preferred shares entitled the owner to vote on amendment of the articles of incorporation and
merger or dissolution, but not on election of the board of directors or on general policy or manage-
ment of the corporation. Id. at 862.
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ness operations and was owned exclusively by the Lee family. 6 Upon her
death Mrs. Lee bequeathed her community one-half interest in the
common stock to her husband and her community one-half interest in the
preferred stock to charity. 7
The question presented to the Tax Court was the proper method of
valuing Mrs. Lee's interest in the shares of stock held by her husband and
her as community property for the purpose of federal estate taxation. 8 The
Lee court chose between two possible methods of valuing a spouse's one-
half interest in community held shares. 9 One method would have first
valued the entire block of shares held by the community, then divided that
value in half to determine the value of the decedent's interest. 10 Since the
block held by the community was a majority block, this method would
have produced a higher valuation because a control premium would have
been assessed." The method chosen by the Lee court was to divide the
community held block in half first, then to value the half-size block sepa-
6. Most of Palin's assets were undeveloped realty and only five percent of the stipulated net asset
value of the corporation was accounted for by the trucking operation which lent its name to the hold-
ing company. Id- at 870.
7. The court's discussion of the valuation of the preferred stock bequeathed to charities, id. at
876, is beyond the scope of this note.
8. The valuation procedure determines the value of the decedent's interest in property includible
in her gross estate for federal tax purposes. The Internal Revenue Code provides: "The value of the
gross estate shall include the value of all property to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent
at the time of his death." I.R.C. § 2033. State law determines the nature and extent of the interest to
which federal tax provisions apply. See, e.g., Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940).
Morgan held that the federal court initially must determine whether an interest or right created by
local law was the object intended to be taxed before federal law can be applied to tax the interest. See
also Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 109-10 (1930). Valuation of the gross estate is covered by
I.R.C. § 2031.
9. 69 T.C. at 873-74.
10. Id. at 871.
1I. If a shareholder died owning a controlling interest, a control premium would be added to the
value of the shares taxed to his estate, whether he transferred the entire block to one beneficiary who
acquired control or to several beneficiaries, none of whom acquired control. See Watts, The Fair
Market Value of Actively Traded Securities, 30 TAx LAW. 51, 71 (1976). The Lee court apparently
disregarded the fact that this method would have produced a value higher than half the net asset value
represented by the Lees' block. The valuation method it chose discounted from a proportion of the
corporation's net asset value and did not include a control premium. Strictly speaking, halving the
value represented by the community owned block would not have assumed control value.
The terms "premium" and "discount" are difficult to apply to interests in closely held corpora-
tions because they assume a set price (as they do in the conventional context of listed securities) upon
which to add or subtract value. In a closely held corporation there generally is no set price. As one
commentator has noted, a minority discount is not appropriate unless a majority premium has been
assumed: "A minority discount ... is a corollary of a majority premium and depends on the latter for
its validity. A discount for lack of control is only appropriate if the amount discounted already in-
cludes a majority premium." Fellows & Painter, Valuing Corporations for Federal Transfer Taxes:
A Statutory Solution to the Disappearing Wealth Syndrome, 30 STAN. L. REv. 895, 909-10 (1976).
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rately. 12 This latter method results in a lower valuation of the spouse's
interest. Since the block produced by dividing the community property is
a minority interest, a discount for lack of control is allowed. 13
This note questions the propriety of allowing discounts to reflect lack
of control where spouses enjoyed joint control over undivided interests in
a majority block of shares. The issue is examined in light of existing case
law and by reference to Washington community property law and federal
estate taxation policies. The note concludes that, although Lee is not con-
trary to any explicit provision in the Internal Revenue Code, discounting
a deceased spouse's share of a community owned majority block neither
accurately reflects the degree of control its owners enjoyed nor effectively
taxes wealth transfers at death.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Valuation of Stock in Closely Held Corporations
The effect of community property ownership on valuation had not been
considered prior to Lee. Valuation of stock in closely held corporations,
however, generally has been a matter of some dispute, particularly with
regard to minority interest discounts. 14 Part of the difficulty inheres in the
nature of closely held corporations. Because there is no active stock trad-
ing, value cannot be based on quoted prices. Furthermore, in family
corporations there rarely are arms-length transactions which might indi-
cate value. 15
12. 69 T.C. at 872-74.
13. A minority interest denotes ownership of a block of shares which represents 50% or less of
the outstanding shares in a corporation. Generally a minority interest does not give its owner manag-
ing control of a corporation because it does not give voting control. But lack of effective control is not
always a concomitant. The term 'arithmetic minority' as used in this note refers merely to the size of
a block of shares. It does not imply any degree of control incident to its ownership. See note 21 and
accompanying text infra (discussion of advantages of owning a controlling interest).
14. Cohan, Valuation of Interests in Closely Held Businesses, 44 TAXES 504 (1966); Feld, The
Implications of Minority Interest and Stock Restrictions in Valuing Closely Held Shares, 4 U. PA. L.
REv. 934 (1974); Fellows & Painter, note 11 supra. Feld advocates a presumption that a donor who
makes minority transfers to those who will be part of a control group should be required to come
forward with evidence to show that a recipient who is claimed to be a minority shareholder actually
suffers the disability of an outsider. Feld, supra, at 945. Some courts have used this approach. See,
e.g., Blanchard v. United States, 291 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Iowa 1968) (potential discount for minority
shares disallowed because control was an element of value transferred to donee or legatee). But see
Maytag v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 962 (10th Cir. 1951); Phipps v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 141
(2d Cir. 1943).
15. See Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, which outlines the methods to be used and factors
to be considered in valuing shares of stock in closely held corporations for federal estate and gift tax
purposes.The Ruling defines closely held corporations:
Closely held corporations are those corporations the shares of which are owned by a relatively
273
Washington Law Review Vol. 55:271, 1979
The Code and Treasury Regulations provide that the fair market value
of unlisted stocks and securities is to be included in a decedent's gross
estate for federal estate tax purposes.16 Fair market valuation involves a
heavily fact-oriented inquiry which depends on a number of factors, ' 7 in-
cluding the size of the block to be valued and the degree of control it rep-
resents. 18 But neither the Revenue Rulings nor the case law provide a
method of applying the relevant factors, and neither elucidate the rela-
tionship between value and control. 19
limited number of stockholders. Often the entire stock issue is held by one family. The result of
this situation is that little, if any, trading in the shares takes place. There is, therefore, no estab-
lished market for the stock and such sales as occur at irregular intervals seldom reflect all of the
elements of a representative transaction as defined by the term "fair market value."
Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, § 2.03.
16. I.R.C. § 2031(b); Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2, T.D. 7432, 1976-2 C.B. 264: § 25 2512-2.
T.D. 7238, 1973-1 C.B. 544. The Code states:
In the case of stock and securities of a corporation the value of which, by reason of their not
being listed on an exchange and by reason of the absence of sales thereof, cannot be determined
with reference to bid and asked prices or with reference to sales prices, the value thereof shall be
determined by taking into consideration, in addition to all other factors, the value of stock or
securities of corporations engaged in the same or a similar line of business which are listed on an
exchange.
I.R.C. § 203 1(b) (emphasis added).
The Treasury Regulations define fair market value as "the price at which the property would
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy
or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts." Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b. T.D.
7432, 1976-2 C.B. 264. See also Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1, T.D. 7238. 1973-I C.B. 544.
17. Revenue Ruling 59-60 lists the factors to consider in determining the fair market value of
closely held stocks:
(a) The nature of the business and the history of the enterprise from its inception.
(b) The economic outlook in general and the condition and outlook of the specific industry
in particular.
(c) The book value of the stock and the financial condition of the business.
(d) The earning capacity of the company.
(e) The dividend-paying capacity.
(f) Whether or not the enterprise has goodwill or other intangible value.
(g) Sales of the stock and the size of the block to be valued.
(h) The market price of stocks of corporations engaged in the same or a similar line of busi-
ness having their stocks actively traded in a free and open market, either on an exchange or over-
the-counter.
Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, § 4.01. The Code provides that valuation of unlisted stocks and
securities should take into consideration,"all other factors." I.R.C. § 2031(b).
18. Treasury Regulations declare that the degree of control associated with a block of shares is
relevant to valuation. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(f), T.D. 7432, 1976-2 C.B. 264; § 25.2512-2(f).
T.D. 7238, 1973-1 C.B. 544. Revenue Ruling 59-60 notes that the size of a block and the degree of
control associated with it should be considered in valuation and emphasizes the factual nature of fair
market valuation. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, § 3.01, 4.02(g).
19. While Rev. Rul. 59-60 clearly states that the size of a block does not determine whether it
connotes a controlling interest, the Ruling does not mention what circumstances may indicate a
higher valuation for an arithmetic minority. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, § 4.02(g).
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B. Control as an Element of Value
Minority interest discounts reflect the lower value of a minority block
of shares due to the owner's inability to exercise control over corporate
decisionmaking. 20 Corporate control includes, for example, the power to
declare dividends, effect liquidation, and create salaried management po-
sitions. 21 The Internal Revenue Service has provided no clear standards
concerning when a discount is available for lack of control, and the deci-
sions are in conflict.22 The Service has indicated that control is a question
of fact23 and is not determined solely by the size of a block. 24 Some
courts, however, have allowed discounts based only on a finding that a
block constitutes an arithmetic minority (fifty percent or less of the corpo-
ration's outstanding shares). 25
Other courts have recognized that mechanical applications of discounts
20. The propriety of minority discounts was first discussed in Ray Consol. Copper Co. v. United
States, 268 U.S. 373 (1925). The Court noted that the value of capital stock in a company bears no
necessary relation to the value of the company's net assets. Furthermore, because control of a corpo-
ration may justify a higher price for a particular block of stock, small amounts of stock are not neces-
sarily worth their proportionate share of the whole. Id. at 377. Stewart v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A.
201 (1934), nonacq., 14 C.B. 38 (1934) was the first case to define percentage discounts for minority
interests. The trend has been toward greater discounts: 42% was the average discount in the period
1970-75. Dant, Courts Increasing Amount of Discount for a Minority Interest in a Business, 43 J.
TAX. 104, 109 (Aug. 1975). See also Moroney, Most Courts Overvalue Closely Held Stocks, 51
TAXES 144 (1973). See generally Cohan, note 14 supra; Feld, note 14supra.
The control factor in valuation should be distinguished from lack of marketability, a factor which
reflects that there is generally no ready market in which to trade closely held stocks such as there is
for shares in a publicly held corporation. Fellows & Painter, supra note 11, at 918 n.82. Lack of mar-
ketability has been confused with minority discount by some courts, which have referred to minority
interest discounts as compensation for lack of marketability. See, e.g., Estate of Bright v. United
States, No. CA-3-76-1264-F (N.D. Tex., filed Apr. 13, 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-2221 (5th
Cir., June 7, 1978); Worthen v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 727, 729, 732 (D. Mass. 1961); Goss v.
Fitzpatrick, 97 F. Supp. 765, 767 (D. Conn. 1951); Estate of Cotchett v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M.
(CCH) 138, 142 (1974). Lack of marketability and degree of control are independent factors in valua-
tion. For example, a small block of shares in a public corporation may have a reduced value because
of lack of control and yet be readily traded. And a majority block in a closely held corporation is a
controlling interest but there may be no ready market for its sale.
21. See Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78 HARV.
L. REv. 505, 526 (1965); Feld, supra note 14, at 936.
22. See notes 25 & 26 and accompanying text infra.
23. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, § 3.01.
24. Rev. Rul. 59-60 states:
The size of the block of stock itself is a relevant factor to be considered. Although it is true
that a minority interest in an unlisted corporation's stock is more difficult to sell than a similar
block of listed stock, it is equally true that control of a corporation, either actual or in effect,
representing as it does an added element of value, may justify a higher value for a specific block
of stock.
Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, § 4.02(g) (emphasis added).
25. See, e.g., Sundquist v. United States, 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 13,035 (E.D. Wash. 1974).
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for minority interests may be inappropriate where de facto control is held
by members of a family through an aggregate majority interest. 26 The ra-
tionale for disallowing discounts under such circumstances is that related
minority shareholders suffer no disability in corporate decisionmaking.
Thus a family group enjoys actual control even though individual mem-
bers hold minority interests.27 Furthermore, transfers by related
shareholders who constitute a control group are often intrafamily so that
family control is retained. 28
C. Minority Discounts in the Marital Context
The argument that de facto control should be recognized in valuing mi-
nority interests held by members of a controlling group is even stronger in
the marital context. This conclusion follows not only from a recognition
that spouses cooperate in managing their business interests, but also from
pragmatic considerations.There are obviously greater economic benefits
to be gained from joint management and sales of majority blocks than
from minority transactions. It would presumably take a great deal of hos-
tility between spouses to override these considerations. If in fact spouses
enjoy control over decisionmaking in a closely held corporation, and if
26. In an early vabiation ca,e the Tax Court emphasized that finding a minority interest in a
family corporation should not, without more, trigger a minority discount. Richardson v. Commis-
sioner, 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 1039 (i9.-3), aj.J, 151 F.2d. 102 (2d Cir. 1945). cert. denied, 326 U.S.
796 (1946). The Richardson view has not been generally accepted. Discounts have been disallowed.
however, where donors made gifts of m nority interests to family members. See. e.g.. Driver v.
United States, 76-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 13.155, at 85,699 (W.D. Wis. 1976) (no minority discount
allowed where donor who owned controlling interest made inter vivos gifts of minority interests):
Blanchard v. United States, 291 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Iowa 1968) (no minority discount allowed where
donor, whose family owned the controlling interest in a bank, made gifts of minority interests to six
relatives). But see Clark v. United States, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 13,076, at 87,489 (E.D.N.C. 1975):
Drybrough v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 279 (W.D. Ky. 1962); Hermelin v. Commissioner, 36
T.C.M. (CCH) 426 (1977); Messing v.Commissioner, 48 T.C. 502 (1967), acq. 1968-I C.B. 2.
Many courts have not allowed minority discounts in valuing a decedent's minority interest where
controlling stock is owned by family members. See, e.g., Forbes v. Hassett, 124 F.2d 925, 929 (st
Cir. 1942); Rothgery v. United States, 475 F.2d 591, 594 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Estate of Jenner v. Com-
missioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 241, 246-48 (1977); Estate of Hayes v. Commissioner. 32 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1102 (1973); Estate of Cruikshank v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 162, 165 (1947). But see Sund-
quist v. United States, 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 13,035, at 85,870 (E.D. Wash. 1974); Obermer v.
United States, 238 F. Supp. 29, 34-36 (D. Hawaii 1964); Goss v. Fitzpatrick, 97 F. Supp. 765.
766-67 (D. Conn. 1951); Righter v. United States, 439 F.2d 1204, 1218-19 (Ct. Cl. 1971): Estateof
Katz v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 825, 834 (1968).
27. See, e.g.. Richardson v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1945), affg 2 T.C.M. (CCH)
1039 (1943), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 796 (1946); Blanchard v. United States, 291 F. Supp. 348. 352
(S.D.Iowa 1968).
28. See, e.g., Price, Transmission of Wealth at Death in a Community Property Jurisdiction, 50
WASH. L. REv. 277, 311 (1975) ("in all jurisdictions studied, an overwhelming majority of the mar-
ried testators have given all of their property to their surviving spouses").
276
Valuation of Community Owned Stock
those spouses do not devalue interests in majority blocks by dispositions
which would destroy control, the value of the transferred interests should
not be subject to the same discounts for lack of control which are proper
for minority interest transfers by outsiders.
The Internal Revenue Service has urged rejection of minority discounts
in cases where a husband and wife's shares together constituted a control-
ling interest in a family corporation. Courts considering the issue,
however, have decided that a spouse's minority interest was subject to
discounting. 29
In Obermer v. United States,30 the court held that the decedent
spouse's one-half interest in a corporation owned entirely by the spouses
was subject to a discount. The court found that the decedent's ability to
transfer only his half interest justified this result because a hypothetical
buyer would be unable to gain control by acquiring the interest. In Sund-
quist v. United States,31 a Washington case, the spouses together owned a
controlling interest in the family fruit and cold storage business. The
court found the presumption in favor of community property overcome by
a separate property agreement between the spouses respecting the busi-
ness. 32 Since either spouse could transfer only a block comprising less
than half of the corporation's total shares, 33 the court found that a minor-
ity discount was proper. In neither case did the legal interests of the
spouses in the shares of stock extend over the entire block owned by the
husband and wife together. Neither the Obermer nor the Sundquist courts
considered whether the deceased spouses had effective control. Further,
even though in both instances the surviving spouse became the sole owner
of the corporation by the decedent's bequest, because a hypothetical buy-
er would be unable to gain control by acquiring the decedent's interest
the courts determined that discounting was proper. 34
II. LEE COURT'S REASONING
The Lee court determined that the most pertinent factors in valuing the
stock were "its net asset value, the specific rights under the preferred and
29. Sundquist v. United States, 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 13,035, at 85,868 & 85,870 (E.D. Wash.
1974); Obermer v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 29 (D. Hawaii 1964).
30. 238 F. Supp. 29 (D. Hawaii 1964).
31. 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 13,035 (E.D. Wash. 1974).
32. Id. at 85,868.
33. Of the total of 2,000 shares, the couple owned 1,100, or 55%. The Internal Revenue Service
considered this to be community property. Id. At the time of her death, the wife held 550 shares in
her own name. The separate character of this property was established by a prior family partnership
agreement and by mutual observation of this agreement. Id. at 85,870.
34. Obermer, 238 F. Supp. at 34; Sundquist, 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 13,035, at 85,870.
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common stock, and the degree of control of the business represented by
the blocks of stock to be valued." 35 In its consideration of the degree of
control represented by Elizabeth Lee's interest, the court found her ability
to bequeath only an undivided one-half interest in the community owned
stock determinative. 36 The court assumed that shares of stock are fungible
and found that the entire 4,000 shares of common and 50,000 shares of
preferred stock owned by the community constituted one item in which
the Lees each had an undivided one-half interest. 37 The court reasoned
that, since under Washington law the surviving spouse had an undivided
one-half interest in the entire block of the community owned shares, 38 his
interest could not be satisfied by other property equal to the value of one-
half the shares. 39 The court, therefore, determined that the value of the
decedent's interest could not be half the value of the total number of
shares.
However, by assuming that the shares of stock were fungible, 40 the
court found that each spouse's undivided one-half interest "was equiva-
lent to each having a separate interest in a block of 2,000 shares of com-
mon and 25,000 shares of preferred." 41 Thus the court concluded that
Mrs. Lee's interest should be valued after the total number of shares was
divided in half.42 Since the division produced two blocks, each of which
represented forty percent of the outstanding common shares and fifty per-
cent of the outstanding preferred shares, Mrs. Lee's interest in the
corporation was found to be a minority interest. 43 Since the court did not
consider whether in fact Mrs. Lee's interest represented any significant
degree of managerial control, its conclusion that the value of this interest
should be reduced by a minority discount was apparently based on an as-
sumption that the holder of a minority interest is unable to exercise con-
trol over corporate affairs.
III. CRITICISM AND ANALYSIS
The Lee court's conclusion that a spouse's interest in community prop-
erty should be valued after dividing the property in half rested on two
35. Estate of Lee v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 860, 869-70 (1978).
36. Id. at 874.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 873 (citing In re Estate of Patton, 6 Wn. App. 464, 494 P.2d 238, review denied. 80
Wn. 2d 1009 (1972)).
39. Estate of Lee v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 860, 873 (1978).
40. Id. at 874 n.7. The court's assumption that shares of stock are fungible is mistaken. With
regard to value, one share of a majority block is worth more than one share of a minority block.
41. Id. at 874 (emphasis added).
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premises. First, the court reasoned that, because a spouse can bequeath
only an undivided one-half interest in an item of community property at
death, that spouse's interest in the corporation is equivalent to a separate
interest in half the total number of shares owned by the community. 44
Second, it assumed that a separate interest amounting to fifty percent or
less of the outstanding shares was automatically entitled to a minority in-
terest discount.45 Both these premises are incorrect because they ignore
the basis for allowing minority discounts: actual lack of control over cor-
porate decisionmaking. 46
The Lee valuation method assumes that, because the legal characteriza-
tion of a spouse's interest in community property changes at death to
separate property, 47 the nature of the property interest prior to death is
irrelevant to its valuation for estate tax purposes. But federal estate tax,
which taxes the decedent's estate, attaches to the value of property in the
decedent's hands. 48 This is to be distinguished from gift taxes, for exam-
ple, which tax the value of the property interest created. 49 The Lee court
failed to examine facts which may have indicated that Mrs. Lee enjoyed
control over the corporation through her interest in the majority block
owned by the community. Community property law was considered sig-
nificant only insofar as it limited a spouse's testamentary power of dispo-
sition. 50
Disregarding the community property nature of the shares amounted to
treating Mrs. Lee's interest in the corporation as if it were a separate in-
terest. Given that the degree of control associated with a block of shares is
a question of fact, the community property character of Mrs. Lee's
interest was clearly relevant to determining whether the value of that in-
terest should be reduced to reflect lack of control.
Under Washington law, each spouse has an undivided one-half interest
in community property. 51 Either spouse may, under most circumstances,
44. Id. at 874.
45. Id. at 876.
46. See notes 21, 23 & 24 and accompanying text supra.
47. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.030(1) (1976); In re Estate of Patton, 6 Wn. App. 464, 494 P.2d
238, review denied, 80 Wn. 2d 1009 (1972).
48. See I.R.C. § 2031(a). See also note I1 supra.
49. See Mayer v. Reinecke, 130 F.2d 350 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 684 (1942) (estate
tax is excise upon transfer of estate at death of owner; it attaches to the interest caused by reason of
death rather than the interest to which some person succeeds on death). See also Committee on Death
Taxation of Estates and Trusts, Probate and Trust Division, Property Owned With Spouse: Joint Ten-
ancy, Tenancy by the Entireties and Community Property, I 1 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 405,414
(1972).
50. Estate of Lee v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 860, 874 (1978). See WAsH. REv. CODE § 26.16.-
030(1) (1976).
51. In re Estate of Towey, 22 Wn. 2d 212, 155 P.2d 273 (1945); In re Estate of Patton, 6 Wn.
App. 464, 494 P.2d 238, review denied, 80 Wn. 2d 1009 (1972).
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transfer any or all of the community interest. 52 In contrast, neither spouse
may make an inter vivos transfer of only that spouse's interest in the com-
munity property under any circumstances. 53 Washington community
property law gives either spouse total power to dispose, manage, and con-
trol community personal assets to the same extent as separate assets. 54
Either spouse can vote the entire block of stock owned by the community
and can assign proxy rights to it. 55
A spouse's interest in community owned stock allows nearly unfettered
control over the entire block, not just half of it. Where the community
owns a majority block, either spouse can exercise majority control. 56
Thus, the degree of control incident to an undivided one-half interest in a
community owned majority block is not equivalent to the degree of con-
trol incident to a separate minority block, since each spouse is able to
partake in the benefits of a controlling interest. But neither is the degree
of control equivalent to separate ownership of a majority block, which
would give its owner sole individual control over the corporation. Com-
munity property law allows the spouses joint control, which amounts to
52. WASH. REV CODE § 26.16.030 (1976). The statute also explicitly states the exceptions to a
spouse's power to dispose of community property.
53. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(2) (1976). Nor is the interest of only one of the spouses in the
community capable of being severed on levy and execution upon either a separate or community
obligation. See Sagmeister v. Foss, 4 Wash. 320, 30 P. 80 (1892); Littel & Smythe Mfg. Co. v.
Miller, 3 Wash. 480, 28 P. 1035 (1892); Brotton v. Langert, I Wash. 73, 23 P. 688(1890).
54. WASH REV CODE § 26.16.030 (1976). In Hanley v. Most, 9 Wn. 2d 429, 115 P.2d 933
(1941), the court held that this statute provides for complete and unrestrained management power and
that the husband has the power to deal with such property. As long as the spouse acts for the commu-
nity and the community interest, the court will not interfere with management decisions. The 1972
amendments to R.C.W. § 26.16.030 allow each spouse, not just the husband, to manage community
personal property to the same extent that a spouse may control and manage separate property. Ch.
108, § 3, 1972 Wash. Laws, 2d Ex. Sess. 246 (amending WASH REV CODE § 26.16.030 (1963)).
Professor Cross notes that analyses defining the extent of management and transfer powers held
exclusively by the husband prior to 1972 now apply to both spouses. Thus, pre-1972 cases on the
subject are still authoritative. Cross, Equality for Spouses in Washington Community Property Law-
1972 Statutory Changes, 48 WASH L. REV 527, 541 (1973).
55. R.C.W. § 23A.08.310 provides that for community owned stock only the signature of the
spouse named as the shareholder is required for making a valid stock transaction:
Certificates of stock and the shares represented thereby standing in the name of a married person
may be transferred by such person, such person's agent or attorney, without the signature of
such person's spouse. All dividends payable upon any shares of a corporation standing in the
name of a married person, shall be paid to such married person, such person's agent or attorney,
in the same manner as if such person were unmarried, and it shall not be necessary for the other
spouse to join in a receipt therefore; and any proxy or power given by a married person, touching
any shares of any corporation standing in such person's name, shall be valid and binding without
the signature of the other spouse.
WASH. REV CODE § 23A.08.310 (1976).
56. The major limitation on control is a practical one. Since each spouse has coextensive powers
under the 1972 amendment, see note 54 supra, a spouse is unable to exercise control where he or she
disagrees with the other spouse and the latter exercises the power first.
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something greater than a separate minority interest, but something less
than a separate majority interest. Thus the fact that a majority block is
held as community property clearly affects the value of each spouse's in-
terest. The Lee method does not recognize the additional value of control
that community property ownership confers. By dividing the community
owned majority block prior to valuation, this method values a deceased
spouse's interest as if it were a minority interest completely unrelated to
the original controlling block. 57
IV. PROPOSAL
By dividing the community property prior to valuation, the Lee court
found, in effect, that as a matter of law no degree of control is attributable
to a deceased spouse's interest in a community owned majority block of
shares. The court's refusal to value the community's majority block prior
to determining the value of the decedent's one-half interest apparently
was based on a perception that to do so would equate the decedent's one-
half interest with a separate interest in the entire majority block. This re-
jected alternative method is not, however, equivalent to valuing the de-
cedent's interest as a separate majority interest. If the decedent's one-half
interest were valued as a separate majority interest, her estate would be
assessed the entire control premium associated with that majority block.
But assessing a control premium for the entire community block, then
halving that value, includes in the decedent's estate only one-half the con-
trol premium. Thus the alternative method essentially splits the value of
control between the decedent's estate and the surviving spouse's one-half
interest.
This method appears to comport with the degree of control that each
spouse actually has over a community held majority block. A spouse's
undivided one-half interest in a community held majority block is some-
thing greater than a separate minority interest and something less than a
separate majority interest. The proposed method of including half the
value of a control premium assessed against the entire community estate
reflects the degree of control associated with an undivided one-half inter-
57. The Lee method treats spouses with a community property interest in stock as outsiders. An
outsider is a minority shareholder who owns shares having asset value and income value, but who is
unable to participate in determining the operating policies of a corporation. Feld, supra note 14, at
936. As one commentator stated:" 'Minority stockholders' means only noncontrolling stockholders,
even if the controlling stockholder is not a majority stockholder." Andrews, supra note 21, at 506
n.5. This usage of the term "minority stockholder" is supported by a leading case on corporate con-
trol. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 175 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
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est in a majority block more accurately than the method employed by the
Lee court.
V. CONCLUSION
The valuation method used in Lee disregards the control that spouses
have over a community held majority block of shares in a closely held
corporation. The Lee method precludes an inquiry in individual cases to
determine whether in fact the transferor of a minority interest suffers from
a lack of control such that a lower valuation is appropriate. The Code,
Treasury Regulations, and Revenue Rulings presently support and argu-
ably mandate a more refined inquiry into the degree of control associated
with a given block of stock than a determination of its size. Particularly in
closely held corporations where control is retained within the family and
where there is no intention to offer shares for sale to the public, allowing
discounts merely on the finding that an interest is an arithmetic minority
produces a windfall for the taxpayer.
Lisa S. Frye
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